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I. INTRODUCTION
Representation holds the promise of self-government for a large
republic. The importance, innovation, and genius of this feature of
our constitutional scheme cannot be overstated. But it is in some
rough waters. The possibility of common ground, which is at the
heart of the notion of representation itself,' seems more elusive than
ever. The meaningfulness of accountability, so important to the le-
gitimacy of representation as a vehicle for self-government, is dimin-
ishing noticeably. The epidemic of gerrymandering to protect in-
cumbents is more widespread and entrenched than ever thought
possible.2 Decades of efforts to overcome race discrimination in ac-
cess to voting and in districting have led to little sense of success in
eradicating the lasting effects of de ure segregation or stemming the
trend toward de facto segregation. These horrors do not even in-
clude mention of the interest-group issues that have widely under-
mined confidence in the possibility of meaningful representativeness
of legislative voting.4
This list of laments is long and serious and in some ways over-
whelming. Each of the problems is the subject of specialized research
and policy study by scholars in different fields doing both empirical
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and theoretical work to try to address them one by one. But the
overall prognosis is quite bleak, not offering much to give an objec-
tive observer any confidence that the system of representative gov-
ernment is doing the work that we count on it to do as the pivot of
our improvisation in self-government. We count on representative
government, not only to carry out the daily work of making and en-
forcing policy for the country, but also to meet our collective psychic
need for a sense of legitimacy as it does so.
Courts have always maintained a posture of respect for political,
or representative, decision making as the most legitimate for a de-
mocracy. Even at the heights of the most activist judicial periods,
courts departed from legislative decisions in only a tiny fraction of ex-
traordinary cases relative to the number of laws to which they de-
ferred on the ground of legitimacy! Mostly, courts have accepted the
idea that they are a deviant institution in a democracy and have fash-
ioned substantive rules to reflect that role. 6
Indeed, the principle of majority rule, widely accepted as both a
shorthand for the will of the People and, in turn, the animating force of
representation, is prized by the laity and privileged by the law. It
boasts a moral claim of fairness and enjoys an iconic status in a system
rhetorically devoted to popular self-government.
There is reason to be concerned about whether that well-loved
tenet is capable of bearing the load for our democracy that the Con-
stitution envisioned or that we depend on it to bear in a constitu-
tional scheme crafted to accord primacy to representative govern-
ment. But if well-founded concerns exist, it is not obvious that the
Supreme Court has, or should have, anything to say about the matter.
Any hope that judicial review could solve these deeply institutional
and political malfunctions is surely optimistic at best. Thus, the ques-
tion is, what should a court do when faced with significant structural
concerns about whether the machinery of representative government
is running properly?
The Lochner Court, for example, upheld many more state labor laws than it struck down.
See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental
Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 21-38 (2003) (giving a brief overview of the legislation
the Lochner court upheld and struck down). Similarly, the Warren Court was responsible for
according an absolutely toothless "rational relation" scrutiny, at least in the absence of suspect
criteria. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (according high degree of deference
to state law); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (affirming that "[t]he day is
gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause ... to strike down state laws ... because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought").
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728-35 (1997) (recognizing Washington's
state interest in protecting life and upholding the state's assisted suicide ban); Cruzan v. Dir.,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282-87 (1990) (upholding Missouri's heightened eviden-
tiary requirement for withdrawing life support).
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This essay will argue that there is a role, and that there tradition-
ally has been a role, for the Court in holding out at least a minimal
safety net of control over the renegade legislative process of state and
federal government. It suggests that a long and consistent practice of
the Supreme Court supports indirectjudicial supervision of legislative
functions through scrutinization of resulting legislation for evidence
of malfunction or structural compromise. This, I argue, is the heart
of the role of liberty protection under the Constitution, whether it be
under the Due Process Clause 7 or the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.8
II. THE COURT'S "COMPENSATORY" APPROACH TOJUDICIAL REVIEW
Historically, when the integrity of a constitutional structure or
process--one that a court cannot prudently or practically supervise
directly-has appeared to be at risk, the Court has responded by ag-
gressively applying some specific constitutional provision, not always
obviously correlated, that it could supervise directly. In the face of
such a structural concern, the Court tends to identify a constitutional
standard that is susceptible to judicial supervision and apply the stan-
dard in hopes of indirectly ameliorating the consequences of the
original structural or procedural problem. For example, after the
rise of the administrative state, concerns increased regarding the
structural compromise in separation of powers that it necessarily en-
gendered. The three powers of legislation, execution, and adjudica-
tion frequently merged in one government agency. Moreover, the
agencies themselves were vulnerable to the criticism that they were an
unaccountable fourth branch of government, making law without the
structural protections that had characterized the original design of
the federal government. 9 The Court responded to these concerns,
not by interfering directly in the political decisions that resulted in
the creation of the administrative state,' ° but instead by recognizing
new procedural rights in individuals affected by agency decision-
making. It crafted new rules regarding separation of functions within
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4; id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
8 Id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
9 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 575-78 (1984).
10 The Court struck down only two statutes for violation of the nondelegation doctrine, for
example. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 419 (5th ed. 2005). See A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating the Live Poultry
Code, Exec. Order No. 6675A (Apr. 13, 1934), reprinted in Schechter, 295 U.S. at 525 n.5); Pa-
nama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (striking down part of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act, ch. 90, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933)).
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an agency, reason-giving and accountability of agencies to the out-
side world, and rights to certain procedures and impartiality12-all
under the auspices of the Constitution.1 3 Thus, individual protections
under the Due Process Clause served to ameliorate some of the con-
sequences of the perceived structural deficiencies in the government.
The Court's concerns over proper functioning of state legislative
processes-again, a place where the Court could not have intervened
directly14-yield a similar story. Concerned about the corrosive and
antidemocratic effects of racism and other we/they motivations un-
derlying government action, the Warren Court developed a host of
individual rights claims that were amenable to Court resolution. The
development of tiers of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,
for example, brings to the Court, in a form judicially accessible and
manageable, the outputs of the suspect legislative processes and sub-
jects them to a test designed to smoke out a certain type of represen-
tative malfunction. This accomplishes an indirect judicial supervision
of the basic representative obligation in the states. Similarly, the
Court developed the one-person-one-vote test, strangely translated
into an individual right, as a judicially manageable window into the
otherwise inaccessible processes of state apportionment, about whose
integrity the Court had reason to worry.15 This way of understanding
the ethos of the Warren Court is all very familiar, thanks to John Hart
Ely. 16
It is important to recognize, however, that this kind of approach is
not unique to the Warren Court. More recent examples follow a pat-
tern reflecting an intuition that is comparable in some significant re-
spects. The Rehnquist Court had occasion to consider the bounda-
ries of the congressional commerce power in United States v. Lopez, 7 as
applied to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,' and again in
1 See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47-50 (1975) (holding that administrative exam-
iners need not be disqualified from a case simply because they had previously ruled against one
of the parties).
12 See generally Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487,
1491-94 (1983) (describing general principles of agency decision-making).
13 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2000), facilitated this process;
some think it is constitutionally required.
1 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-56 (1946) (dismissing a challenge to the validity
of congressional districts in Illinois because the judiciary is not the appropriate forum to seek
remedies).
15 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-64 (1964) (holding Alabama's reapportionment
plan invalid because it violated the Equal Protection Clause by overvaluing the votes of pre-
ferred groups).
1 See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980) (characterizing the Warren Court as a "referee" of the political process).
17 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995).
Is Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1702, 104 Stat. 4789, 4844-45.
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United States v. Morrison, as applied to the Civil Rights Remedies for
Gender-Motivated Violence Act.20 In a departure from a prior defer-
ential stance toward Congress's determinations of the bases for its
own powers,2' the Court made clear that it was worried about the
processes that had produced these laws. It speculated as to both mo-
tive and need for the legislation. Unstated, but palpable, in the skep-
tical discussions about Congress was a concern over inappropriate in-
fluences in the legislative process and a sense on the part of the
Court that it should take a nondeferential stand in light of public-
choice insights into the susceptibility of Congress to interest-group
influence.22 Although expressing its concerns in the language of fed-
eralism, the Court seemed to truly be uncomfortable with the way
that, in exercising its previously expansive power over interstate
commerce, Congress did not appear to be taking seriously its funda-
mentally majoritarian obligation to legislate for the common good or
23general welfare. The Court chose to police that procedural obliga-
tion by creating a substantive limitation on the kinds of laws that
would be permitted to emerge from the legislative process under the
24aegis of the commerce power.
The Court's effort to encourage good legislative practice indi-
rectly through the vehicle of the Commerce Clause engendered an
irony: In the name of federalism, a federal law enacting a policy that
was in agreement with existing state policies (such as prohibiting guns
on school property or gender-motivated violence), because it seemed
redundant and therefore perhaps motivated by inappropriate rea-
sons, was less likely to be upheld as within the powers of Congress
than a federal law opposed to existing state policies. If, conversely, the
19 529 U.S. 598, 605-08 (2000).
20 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40302, 108 Stat. 1902, 1941-42 (1994).
21 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303-04 (1964) (holding that where legislators
"have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of
commerce" courts should defer to Congress).
22 Different observers have perceived the phenomenon in different ways, and each has de-
scribed a sense that the Court was worried about how congressional legislation is made. See
MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 40 (2003) (suggesting that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act "might have been 'feel good' legislation," permitting members of Congress to
grandstand or win cheap political points without seriously thinking about policy implications);
Ruth Colker &JamesJ. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80, 84 (2001) (notingJus-
tice Scalia's defense of the Court's activism on the ground that "Congress has an 'attitude'").
23 For an example of the burgeoning body of literature in the decades leading up to Lopez
that had brought attention to the basic insight that small, well-organized groups may have ad-
vantages over more diffuse and numerous coalitions that give them the opportunity for greater
influence in the political process, suggesting that legislatures may be vulnerable to a charge of
not effectuating majoritarian preferences, see MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
24 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-68 (1995) (requiring that Congress limit its
reach to economic activity substantially affecting interstate commerce).
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federal law were imposing an unwelcome policy on unwilling states,
as when it sought to outlaw race discrimination in the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 5 or to criminalize the state-approved medicinal use of
marijuana through the national drug laws, then the Court would be
more likely to uphold the federal law, trusting that Congress was act-
ing for appropriate policy purposes and not merely to score easy po-
litical points with popular-but not necessarily majority-supported-
interests. The irony cannot be explained by federalism considera-
tions. It does make sense, however, if one concludes that the Court
was motivated by a desire to control what it viewed as a wayward legis-
lative process by substantively restricting the scope and type of legisla-
tive programs available to Congress.
Perhaps an even more striking example in this regard is the
Rehnquist Court's approach to affirmative action. In Adarand Con-27
structors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court once again created a new enforce-
able standard under the Constitution for the purpose of policing the
legislative obligation to represent majoritarian preferences. In that
case, it recognized the right of a member of a nonsuspect class to
strict scrutiny in the absence of invidious motivation.28 John Hart Ely
had suggested decades ago that there is reason for suspicion when
the "ins" burden the "outs," for fear of self-serving corruption of legis-
lative obligation; 9 the Rehnquist Court went further to suggest that,
even if the "ins" burden the "ins," there is still reason for suspicion
because such a counterintuitive act of altruism must be motivated by
some undue influence not appropriate to proper functioning of the
legislative body. It therefore contributed to the continuation of what
might strangely claim to be the new "representation-reinforcing" ap-
proach to judicial review of congressional legislation. Unlike the
Warren Court-Ely version of representation-reinforcement, which
guarded against too-vigorous majoritarianism, the new version ap-
pears to ward off legislative motivations that may not be majoritarian
enough."0 While the Court's approach may assume an overly cynical
view of legislative obligation, it is, I suggest, precedent for the propo-
sition that, when the Court has concerns about the integrity of legis-
25 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. See generally Katzenbach, 379 U.S. 294 (holding the Civil
Rights Act constitutional despite state objections).
See generally Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2203-04 (2005).
27 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
28 Id. at 236.
See ELY, supra note 16, at 153. On the subject of what he called "reverse discrimination,"
Ely even went so far as to say, "Whether or not it is more blessed to give than to receive, it is
surely less suspicious." Id. at 171. The Rehnquist Court disagreed. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
30 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitu-
tion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 43, 46, 48-61 (1989) (recognizing the trend in the Rehnquist Court to-
ward reading a principle of majoritarian supremacy into all provisions of the Constitution).
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lative processes, it consistently responds with aggressive interpreta-
tions of substantive constitutional standards that are within its sphere
of enforcement, such as individual rights provisions. Again and
again, across different Courts with different senses of democracy and
different commitments about the judicial role, the abiding theme is
the willingness of the Court to police the operations of government
institutions indirectly by applying judicial scrutiny to their outputs.31
A more recent example that can be understood to reflect this in-
tuition is the Hamdi case. There, the government made several
radical claims. Not only did it argue that it enjoyed the statutory
and/or inherent constitutional authority to seize and detain citizens
as enemy combatants, but it also urged that this power necessarily im-
plied the nonexistence of due process rights in the detainee. While
the plurality of the Court indulged the executive on its claim to
34power, it declined to subsume in that power the elimination of any
judicial check in the form of minimal due process review. The opin-
ion made clear that, while it had accepted the executive's far-ranging
structural claim, the Justices harbored concerns about the implica-
tions of such a claim for the principle of separated and limited pow-
ers. The opinion warned that the government's assertion "that the
courts must forgo any examination of the individual case and focus
exclusively on the legality of the broader detention scheme ... serves
only to condense power into a single branch of government. 3 5 In
short, judicial worries over structure emerged in the form of protec-
tion of rights.
This dance between structural and individual rights aspects of the
Constitution, particularly in areas involving the internal workings of a
representative branch of government, is familiar and useful. In some
ways, it is reminiscent of the important idea of structural reasoning
36introduced by Charles Black in the sixties. Although Black's ap-
proach was distinct in some ways, there is common ground in his em-
phasis on drawing on the large themes of the Constitution-the coex-
31 Some have suggested that this motivation also explains the infamous Lochner v. New York
opinion. According to this view, the Court struck down the labor statute out of concern that a
law protecting a small subset of citizens, vulnerable to a label of partial legislation, might repre-
sent a failure of the impartiality obligation of the state legislative process that produced it. See,
e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA
POLICE POWERSJURISPRUDENCE (1993).
:2 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
3 Id. at 526-28.
The plurality found that the executive's action was authorized by the congressional Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force resolution, id. at 517, and thus had no need to consider
whether there would be authority in the absence of congressional authorization.
35 Id. at 535-36.
See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969) (analyzing the Constitution from a structural perspective).
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istence of national and state government, the nationhood of peo-
ple-in seeking to derive specific applications of cryptic text.
Black argued that, even in the absence of the Fourteenth
Amendment, certain state actions would have to be deemed unconsti-
tutional as interfering with basic structural guarantees in the body of
the Constitution. He focused primarily on the implicit structural re-
lationship between the states and the federal government, and less on
its counterpart, the implicit structural relationship between an indi-
vidual and representative government. But his defense rings true for
the method writ large: "There is ... a close and perpetual interwork-
ing between the textual and the relational and structural modes of
reasoning, for the structure and relations concerned are themselves
created by the text, and inference drawn from them must surely be
controlled by the text."37 For Black, "[i]t is the best wisdom of every
system of law to seek and to cleave unto such intellectual modes" as
lead "directly to the discussion of practical rightness. ' ' The benefit
of this approach is its aspiration of long-term preservation of impor-
tant constitutional values, even when changing times, acting on forces
completely outside the Court's supervisory control, subvert the insti-
tutions on which those values rely. By responding to structural con-
cerns in a way that seeks to compensate for the new threats with judi-
cially cognizable inquiries, the Court contributes to the longevity of
the Constitution. It avoids the stark choice between utter sacrifice of
constitutional principle and an overly aggressive judicial role that
risks relegating the Court to disrespect or possible disregard by the
other branches. It is in the spirit of such compensatory integration
between structure and rights that this essay will proceed to consider
the role of unenumerated rights in our constitutional scheme.
III, THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MAJORIY RULE
In order to consider whether and how a court should recognize
and enforce a general right to liberty, I wish to launch an analysis that
approaches the question structurally, starting from common ground
and proceeding to more controversial ground. In the ongoing de-
bate about so-called unenumerated rights, at least two points are
clear: First, it is clear that the notion of majority rule as a primary
principle of democratic self-government has deep, strong roots in
American jurisprudence and intuition. It is also true that the protec-
tion of liberty rights under the Constitution is often understood to be
in tension with the principle of majority rule, and a threat to the self-
government that is the right of free citizens. This part of the essay
37 Id. at 31.
ss Id. at 23.
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examines the theoretical underpinnings of majority rule in our de-
mocracy in order to explore whether the common critique of liberty
protection on this ground is well taken.
From among the many comprehensive treatments of the justifica-
tions underlying our polity's indisputable commitment to majority
rule, several reasons have emerged as most salient.39 This discussion
considers the nature of the impetus that leads a democratic system to
accept majority rule as a first resort for resolving issues of collective
governance, to accord presumptive respect to decisions reached by
largely majoritarian institutions, and to recognize a principle of judi-
cial deference for the outcomes of majoritarian political processes. I
will then explore the implications of these justifications for the proc-
ess of representation more generally.
The literature reveals roughly three basic families of justifications
for majority rule as a decision process for democracy. 0 First, a classic
liberal argument defends majority rule as a way to "maximize[] the
number of persons who can exercise self-determination in collective
decisions.' ', This justification has roots in the belief that government
should be "based on the consent of the governed. 42  If a system
should accord a minority of citizens the power to decide vital issues of
law and policy, then by definition the proportion of people who have
given their consent to the law is smaller than in a democracy commit-
ted to majority rule. This argument invokes the importance of moral
autonomy as reflected in a system that offers the greatest opportunity
"[t]o live under laws of one's own choosing.
'
,4
Jeremy Waldron offers to this argument a powerful modification
that seeks to cohere more explicitly with a belief in rights. His de-
fense recognizes that people do not necessarily agree on the exis-
tence and content of rights.44 Beyond the question of whether a de-
mocracy should determine and enforce rights lies the more difficult
39 Observers have demonstrated that "majority rule" itself is far from noncontroversial, and
indeed is quite elusive. See Louis Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1571, 1583-85 (1988) (citing both "defects" in political processes and social- and public-
choice insights about legislative decision making to show gaps between political outcomes and
majoritarian outcomes). Nevertheless, it holds an intuitive meaning and appeal in both popu-
lar and constitutional discourse. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,
300 (1990) (Scalia,J., concurring) ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause... requires the democratic
majority to accept for themselves and their loved ones what they impose on you and me.").
See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 138-44 (1989) (offering four basic justi-
fications, one of which-relying on Condorcet's theorem forjury factfinding-is not relevant to
the present discussion); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Prob-
lem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 500-01 (1997) (canvassing arguments for majority rule as a preface to de-
veloping ajustification forjudicial review based on advancing majoritarianism).
DAHL, supra note 40, at 138.
42 Id. at 89.
43 Id. at 91.
44 JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 85 (1999).
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difficult question of how it should do so, given that its people do not
agree on such basic questions as "what we owe each other in the way
of tolerance, forbearance, respect, co-operation, and mutual aid
45-
the very lifeblood of a viable organism of rights recognition. As Wal-
dron reminds us, "[t]here are many of us, and we disagree about jus-
tice."
Waldron argues captivatingly that majority rule is the most defen-
sible decision rule for democracies because it values and respects
these differences among individuals. In contrast to an authoritarian
model by which a sovereign (or ajudge?) selects one outcome that it
favors, he champions majority rule because of its "commitment to
give equal weight to each person's view in the process by which one
view is selected as the group's" and because "it attempts to give each
individual's view the greatest weight possible in this process compati-
ble with an equal weight for the views of each of the others., 47 This
powerful account thus defends majority rule as a decision procedure
(perhaps the only decision procedure) consistent with fairness, re-
spect, and, above all, equality.
A second justification offers the utilitarian argument that majority
rule increases aggregate utility of the society, on the assumption that
"each citizen in the majority will gain at least as much benefit... as
each citizen in the minority will lose."4 9 This theory also assumes that
the preference of each voter counts equally and that each vote accu-
rately represents the preferences of the voters. A related rational-
actor account posits that, at least for the initial decision as to whether
to adopt majority rule, "majority rule maximizes each individual's
chances of prevailing," assuming ignorance about how widely one's
preferences would be shared. 5
A third, more empirical argument in defense of majority rule is
that it has the ability to advance the individual values of civic virtue
and intellectual character that are important to republican theory.
5
1
This view places a premium on the act of participation itself, holding
that the accord of primacy to decisions rendered in this aggregate
way will encourage citizens to feel part of a common undertaking and
45 Id. at 1.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 114.
Id. at 115. Waldron does not claim that majority rule is the only method theoretically
consistent with these values, but suggests that it may be the only one that works in politics with-
out permitting someone to impose a controversial judgment about the substantive content of
equal respect. Id. at 116.
49 DAHL, supra note 40, at 142-44.
50 Seidman, supra note 39, at 1582.
51 See CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 43 (1970) (discussing the
effects of democratic participation on the socialization of individual participants).
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therefore contribute to self-fulfillment through the shared participa-
tion in a political community.
5 2
What is striking about all three of the different defenses of major-
ity rule sketched out here is that, ultimately, they all rest on a founda-
tional conception of equality, albeit in varying degrees of robustness.
Perhaps it should not be surprising that the decision rule so often
held out as the banner of democracy should, in all of its conceptions,
privilege and rely on equality, since, after all, democracy itself is pro-
foundly tied to that principle. Yet because the role of equality in the
justifications of majority rule tends to be implicit rather than explicit,
there is value in bringing it to the surface.
The first justification for majority rule, the liberal account, evi-
dently envisions a strong assumption of equality in its quest to maxi-
mize the degree to which citizens can reap the benefits of self-
determination. This argument necessarily assumes that the greater
the number of people who live under laws of their own choosing the
better, and that the entitlement of persons to moral autonomy is dis-
tributed equally among citizens.
Waldron's variation on this account identifies respect for the indi-
vidual as the core value to be pursued by a decision rule for collective
decision making, also a value derived from a base of equality. Major-
ity rule, Waldron argues, best respects individuals by recognizing that
there are different conceptions of justice and the common good. By
not pretending to give universally recognized correct answers to
moral questions, it thereby more honestly values the fact of dis-
agreement and concomitantly the respect for the views and contribu-
tions of all citizens. This, he acknowledges, is at bottom an argument
from equality.
The utilitarian defense of majority rule also relies on a principle
of equality: the accord of the same value to each citizen's vote, along
with the assumption that each person's vote is the best indication of
that person's interest.53 Indeed, criticisms from within utilitarianism
highlight the implicit value judgment in this account, demanding a
justification for the decision to accord each vote the same value, as
opposed to valuing certain people's interests more based on any
number of possible variables, such as talent, wealth, or intensity of
52 See ELAINE SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 151-53 (1984) (attributing this view to Aristotle); id. at
215 (defending majority rule directly on the ground that it fosters both individuality and com-
munity).
53 See DAHL, supra note 40, at 99 (discussing the presumption that each person is the best
judge of his own interests).
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preference. 4 But the utilitarian defense of majority rule rejects that
departure from the principle of equality.
Similarly, the participatory-process justification of majority rule
also emphasizes the equality-promoting aspects of that decision rule.
It seeks to invigorate civic virtue and enhance self-determination in
the polity by assuring each citizen an equal say in collective decisions.
The core emphasis on participation and interaction highlights an
awareness of equal worth correlated to the equal potential power that
each person brings to the process that will ultimately be resolved by
majority decision. "
Equality lies in some form at the heart of each defense of majority
rule. But at the same time, each chooses to confine or tailor its no-
tion of equality to some limited conception that supports the prof-
fered justification of majority rule, and compels nothing more. For
example, the liberal account values the right to self-determination
among political equals, but it tolerates a scenario in which a member
of the minority is compelled to obey a law imposed by others and
thus, depending on the nature of the law, may be rendered less free
than they. Robert Dahl accepts this critique with the response that
other forms of decision making fare worse on this measure, and at
least by definition more people will have the self-determination if the
majority is given the power to rule. So the principle of equality goes
only so far in this theory.
Waldron, for whom an equality-based respect for the diverse views
of individuals in society requires majority rule, makes a similar move,
even more explicitly. He acknowledges the critique from equality,
which says that a true commitment to respect and equality would
have to take account of "the substantive impact on individuals of the
outcome itself."5' That is, one would have to see just what it is that a
majority is imposing on the minority to be sure that it does not, by its
nature, rob members of the minority of the "substantive respect to
which they are entitled.01 Waldron responds, reminiscent of Dahl,
that since people will disagree about what measure of substantive re-
spect to use, there can be no way to protect against that problem
without privileging some set of views over others. Thus, he accepts
that equality both informs his defense of majority rule and suggests a
problem with it. In resolution, he adopts a view of equality that is, by
54 See Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237, 1248
(2005) (exploring the congruence or incongruence between the number of votes and the
amount of utilitarian good).
55 See SPITZ, supra note 52, at 150-51 (arguing that majoritarian democracy can represent
both diversity of views and unity of purpose).
56 DAHL, supra note 40, at 89-90.
57 AALDRON, supra note 44, at 116.
Os Id. (discussing a critique raised by Charles Beitz).
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his own admission, "necessarily impoverished" so that it stops short of
requiring substantive evaluation of the laws to which a minority are
subjected.59
The second defense of majority rule indulges the same evasive tac-
tic. For the utilitarian, equality suggests counting all preferences
equally, but does not recognize an equality principle thick enough to
suggest that some preferences (to enslave others, for example), may
have implications for equality that cannot be resolved by mere aggre-
gation in the form of majority rule. Again, the animating principle of
equality is given a thin reading to avoid awkward complications.
For the participatory democratic theorist, who supports majority
rule as a means to promote civic virtue, the equality that gives rise to
robust citizenship roles also could present problems if good-faith de-
liberation fails and power politics takes over. While I have found no
solution in this literature, it appears that adherents of that school are
at least willing to face the problem candidly. "All agree with Madi-
son's conclusion: Majority rule demands special safeguards against
majority tyranny."
6 0
If equality truly is the universal impulse that serves as a spring-
board for any discussion of decision rules in a democracy, and if
equality truly is the profound commitment that leads participants in a
democracy to favor majority rule as a first resort, then an honest in-
quiry requires that we also consider the entire array of implications to
which a commitment to equality might lead, including some varia-
tions or limitations on majority rule itself. It is not enough to say that
our commitment to equality takes us only so far-to a principle of
majority rule-and no farther.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF EQUALITY FOR REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT
So far, we have seen that the most prominent justifications for ma-
jority rule as the best decision rule for a democracy spring from a
foundational commitment to equality. If the common ground is a
commitment to equality, it remains to be considered what implica-
tions that commitment will have for a decision rule in a representa-
tive democracy. Pursuing the structural inquiry into the role of lib-
erty protection under the Constitution, the next question is what the
basic structural requirements of a representative system of govern-
ment would be, if we are to adhere to the bedrock commitment to
equality that undergirds the constitutional democracy.
59 Id.
60 SPITZ, supra note 52, at 181.
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John Hart Ely must be the starting place for addressing the ques-
tion of what equality requires of a process of representative govern-
ment. Part of his contribution was the recognition of a link between
equality on the one hand and legislative motivation on the other. In
his view, the concept of representation that had been at the core of
the Constitution from the beginning was carried forward in the Four-
teenth Amendment as a notion of equality. It precluded representa-
tives from refusing to "represent" minority interests, by which he
meant denying them the "'equal concern and respect in the design
and administration of the political institutions that govern them.
62
For starters then, it appears that a commitment to equality obliges
representatives to consider, or have regard for, the interests of all
constituents, even political minorities. One way this obligation might
manifest itself is in refraining from passing laws that accord negative
value to the interests of citizens.
But today, there is more to be learned from Supreme Court cases
on the question of representative obligation beyond just the duty of a
legislature to govern without malice against members of powerless
groups. A window into a deeper understanding of the representative
obligation can be found in the law and theory addressed to the ques-
tion of access to the political process itself. Equal participation in the
selection of representatives has been the focus of considerable
thought and discussion. Many constitutional scholars have written
about what is a fair, inclusive, and democratic way to select the repre-
sentatives who will govern us. Scholars and the Court have debated
the implications of the one-person-one-vote principle now for half a
century and are still actively grappling with the very important issues
involving the ways that the Constitution may constrain a state's free-
dom to draw its district lines for various purposes.64 Little has been
said from any quarter, however, about what a voter is entitled to once
the election is over. Is it possible, for example, that full-fledged po-
litical and judicial warfare could be waged in the name of democracy
to achieve a majority-minority district, just so that the representative
elected from that district could be sent to the legislature to be walled
61 See ELY, supra note 16, at 103 (noting that the political process malfunctions when elected
representatives are motivated to retain their positions by "choking off the channels of political
change" or by "systematically disadvantaging" a minority and thus denying them the same pro-
tection given other groups).
62 Id. at 82 (quoting Dworkin).
Id. at 83-84 (noting that the Framers tied "the interests of those without political power to
the interests of those with it" to give "virtual representation" to the politically weak and ensure
their interests are represented).
64 See, e.g., Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 2, at 541-43 (noting the "ever-increasing [] vigor
of partisan line drawing" as well as the attendant increase in the "array of doctrinal tools litiga-
tors and courts have invoked in attempts to rein it in").
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out of influence and simply outvoted on every issue? If there were no
constraints on what it means to represent, then it seems that the
heated debates over increasing fair and open participation in select-
ing representatives would ring quite hollow.
6
5
Little has been said on this question, in part, no doubt, because it
raises the frightening specter of substantive obligations of legisla-
tures. This is not an idea that has ever gained much purchase in
American constitutional law, and there is no reason to think it would
fare any better now. Nevertheless, in the course of considering as-
pects of the right to vote, the Supreme Court has also had something
to say that may well be relevant to the question of how to conceive of
a minimum expectation of how legislatures are supposed to operate
once elected. In Davis v. Bandemer, for example, the Court consid-
ered whether a claim of partisan political gerrymandering is cogniza-
ble under the Equal Protection Clause. The question is relevant
here because, in the process of considering what kind of harm an in-
tentional gerrymander can cause, the Court necessarily had to say
something about what kind of interest an individual has in being rep-
resented, or correspondingly, what obligation a representative body
has to her. In Bandemer, the Court talked a bit about what claimants
would need to show in order to make out a claim that the state's dis-
tricting scheme had abridged their right to participate in the political
process. One factor worthy of consideration in a case like this, four
Justices said, is whether a group claiming to be shut out of the politi-
cal process can show "the lack of responsiveness by those elected to the
concerns of the relevant groups. ''67 This appears to contemplate ac-
tion by elected representatives once they have entered office-a hint,
perhaps, of a constitutional obligation to represent.
The plurality lent support to this reading when it explained that
the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning
elections. An individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing
candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning
candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as
other voters in the district. We cannot presume in such a situation, with-
out actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will entirely ig-
nore the interests of those voters.
65 See id. at 564 (criticizing Justice Kennedy's focus on looking to "burdens [on] representa-
tional fights" on the ground that such rights "are as yet undefined").
478 U.S. 109 (1986); see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594,
2607 (2006) (declining to revisitjusticiability issue).
67 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131 (emphasis added) (White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, &
BlackmunJJ.).
68 Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
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The negative inference, of course, is that, if a candidate did entirely
ignore the interests of certain voters, a constitutional problem would
arise. The Court went on to emphasize that "unconstitutional dis-
crimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a
manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influ-
ence on the political process as a whole. '" 69 Thus it appears that the elec-
toral process is not itself the end of the Constitution's domain of
concern. After the election, winning and losing voters are entitled, at
least, not to be systematically ignored. That seems to provide a be-
ginning for understanding what it is that a principle of equality de-
mands from the representative process that the Constitution estab-
lishes. It underscores the correctness of Ely's observation that
representation requires that minority interests not be "left out of ac-
count or valued negatively in the lawmaking process."
70
Further help can be found in the Court's consideration of "influ-
ence districts," designed to spread minority voters throughout several
districts in such proportions that, even though they may not have
enough votes to elect a candidate of their choice in any one district,
they have sufficient numbers in each of several districts to compel a
person seeking election in that district to be responsive to their inter-
ests. The Court has explicitly recognized and endorsed the idea of
protecting voting rights through this method of districting.71 Al-
though the concept has been developed primarily through the re-
quirements of the Voting Rights Act, not the Constitution, the statu-
tory requirement is predicated on an obligation not to "deny or
abridge the right to vote, 72 which clearly can be instructive on the
broader question of what it is that a person can claim an entitlement
to in the electoral process and beyond. By the Court's reasoning, a
state can satisfy its obligation to avoid abridging a group's right to
vote by explicitly designing the electoral plan so as to assure under-
represented groups the opportunity to have influence.
To summarize, there has been some recognition of a principle
that groups of voters have an entitlement, beyond the right to cast a
vote, not to be ignored by the person whom their district elects, even
if it is not the person for whom they voted. This is not a personal
right per se, but rather a structural concern about how the political
process works. The process cannot constitutionally be set up in such
Id. (emphasis added). See also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625 & n.9 (1982) (holding
that evidence that "elected officials.., have been unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of
the black community" is a necessary element of a claim of vote dilution).
70 ELY, supra note 16, at 223 n.33.
71 See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 493 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that the
majority expressed approval of "influence districts").
Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2000); cf U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ("The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged .... .").
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a way as to permit, systematically, a representative to ignore the inter-
ests of constituents. Thus, the cases lay the groundwork, albeit still in
underdeveloped form, for the more general observation that to rep-
resent may carry some substantive obligation to pay heed to the in-
terests of one's constituents, even if they are not supporters. Con-
versely, to be represented carries some element of entitlement to
having one's interests or preferences at least considered or taken into
account by the legislative body, even if that body ultimately rejects
those preferences. This idea of a minimal substantive content to the
act of representation derives from the equality guarantees of the
Constitution itself, although the contours of such a constitutional re-
quirement remain to be clarified.
The Supreme Court has thus provided only the barest of indica-
tions of what the representative obligation entails, suggesting that the
entitlement to having one's interests considered in the lawmaking
process is derived from the Constitution. In seeking to understand
this representative obligation better, I turn to a school of thought
that has devoted a great deal of attention to the very question of what
it means for a lawmaking process to take the interests of disagreeing
participants into account. For the theory of deliberative democracy,
the principle of having one's interests considered is a central tenet.
While it is not established that our Constitution requires the delibera-
tive-democracy approach, that theory finds its roots in the civic re-
publican traditions that were influential in the framing of the Consti-
tution and evident in many of its structural features. 3  Those
traditions support a conviction that exposing people to influence and
debate regarding one another's positions is the foundation of a well-
functioning republic. Thus, the deliberative-democracy model rec-
ognizes the same essential place for consultation and persuasion in
the making of law that appears to be included in the minimal consti-
tutional principle of equal participation reflected in the Supreme
Court's vote-dilution and equal protection decisions. Because the
Constitution and the theory of deliberative democracy share this core
idea, the latter, which has had the benefit of quite extensive theoreti-
cal development, can perhaps shed some light on the former, which
has not.
V. LESSONS FROM DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
Basic tenets of deliberative democracy overlap with principles that
the Supreme Court has recognized in the Constitution: meaningful
73 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 20 (1993) (emphasizing also that this
initial influence has been reinforced by subsequent political and constitutional history); id. at
133-34 (outlining the historical sources of deliberative democracy).
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inclusion and political equality.14 Like the Constitution, deliberative
democracy embraces the idea of an equal right of citizens to partici-
pate in political processes and to enjoy basic freedoms, along with the
principle articulated by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson that
"individual citizens should be regarded as moral agents who deserve
equal respect in any justifications of the basic structure of govern-
ment,"'"-very close to the core of representation identified by John
76Hart Ely as inherent in our constitutional structure. In developing
these shared commitments, the deliberative democracy theorists have
elaborated on the notion of equal respect, arguing that it should be
understood as dictating a method for "manifest[ing] mutual respect
[among citizens] as they continue to disagree about... important is-
sues in politics." 77 That method contemplates that citizens and/or
representatives will deliberate and consider competing claims, seek-
ing to persuade and justify their own position to one another. The
process of justification gives rise to a significant role for the offering
of reasons: "[w]hen majorities are obligated to offer reasons to dis-
senting minorities, they expose their position to criticism and give
minorities their most effective and fairest chance of persuading ma-
jorities of the justice of their position. 78
The proponents of deliberative democracy assert two points sig-
nificant for present purposes. First, the basic equality that is a start-
ing point for all democratic theory requires both a chance to partici-
pate and a chance to be heard with dissenting views. Second, the
chance to be heard gives rise in turn to an obligation on the domi-
nant group to supply reasons for their decisions. The reason-giving is
a way both to accord respect to the equal moral status of each citizen
and to achieve better outcomes through meaningful accountability.
This account does not purport to be required as such by the Con-
stitution. Some scholars have sought to link the structural and theo-
retical commitments of the Constitution to some version of the delib-
erative-democracy framework. In particular, this effort finds support
in such areas as the Madisonian view of mandatory enfranchisement
and protection of free speech, coupled with the various institutional
accommodations in the Constitution to deliberation, compromise,
and persuasion, such as bicameralism and indirect election of Senate
and President. 79 The Republican Revival movement, indeed, was in-
74 See id. at 135-37 (deeming "citizenship" and "political equality" commitments flowing
from the deliberative-democracy approach).
75 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 39 (1996).
76 See generally ELY, supra note 16.
77 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 75, at 43.
78 Id. at 44.
79 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 73, at 137 (tracing the historical roots of the link between the
political equality and free speech to Madison).
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spired by a conviction that the Constitution contains basic commit-
ments, features, and arguably imperatives of the civic republican vi-
sion, including a premium on deliberation in politics. 0
I seek to make a slightly stronger, although quite narrow, claim.
The Constitution does contain an obligation of political equality,
which gives rise to an entitlement to both fair participation in the
process of selecting representatives and the opportunity to influence
the decisions and positions of representatives once they are elected.
This much the Supreme Court has told us, although it has not had
occasion to expound fully on what the entitlement to participate
meaningfully and not be ignored in the political process might mean.
In order to pursue that question beyond the limited and some-
times tortured confines of redistricting jurisprudence, I have turned
to the theory of deliberative democracy, which shares both the prem-
ise of political equality and its reflection in an entitlement not to be
ignored. Deliberative democracy, now moving beyond what the Con-
stitution has been held to require, pushes that premise toward an as-
piration of mutual justification in political decision making, by which
citizens and their representatives must make decisions that they can
justify to everyone bound by them with reasons that are accessible to
all. Deliberative democracy teaches us that equality in the political
process, including the opportunity for meaningful influence, leads to
an obligation on those who make the laws to offer reasons for their
decisions. Decisions that fail to take into account the views of dis-
senters, or fail to address with explanations competing concerns with
the public are not just bad politics. They are bad democracy, as they
fail to accord the political equality to which the Supreme Court has
held that all citizens are entitled.
The claim, then, is that the Constitution's premise of political
equality coupled with opportunity to be considered in the legislative
process gives rise to a constitutional obligation on representatives to
provide reasons for their decisions. Only by providing reasons that
are accessible to those bound to live under the laws can a legislature
live up to its obligation to represent with the equal respect that is
each citizen's due.
VI. A REQUIREMENT OF REASONS
I have argued that political equality leads to an obligation on legis-
latures to provide reasons for their actions. This obligation is in some
ways reminiscent of Frank Michelman's discussion in this Symposium
of the Rawlsian promise of public reason, which he eloquently de-
80 See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (responding to the two
main objections toward new republicanism).
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scribes as "the guarantee that the right questions, at least, will be
posed and sincerely debated. ,, " This commitment is "rooted in
commitments to... mutual and reciprocal respect and regard among
persons conceived as reasonable and rational, equal and free ....
It may seem like an alien concept to expect legislatures to provide
reasons for their actions. Often we think of legislatures as doing
whatever they think best, while it is courts alone who have to provide
reasons for their decisions. Yet that is not strictly true. The very
heart of the Constitution's protection of liberty under the Due Proc-
ess Clause invokes the concept of "ordered liberty," which has always
represented a consideration of "the balance which our Nation, built
upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck
between that liberty and the demands of organized society.
' 3
Through this vehicle, the Constitution has required legislatures,
when seeking to restrict important liberties of their people, to pro-
vide reasons that relate to the demands of organized society, gener-
ally referred to as the police power. It has been the job of courts to
receive these reasons and to evaluate whether they, in fact, represent
an effort to advance the common good. Even though there have
been great changes in the application of this principle during the
twentieth century, and even though there is a wide discrepancy be-
tween the degree of deference the Court now accords to some liber-
ties as compared with others, the principle is still operative. Due
process is "regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject
and is adopted in the interests of the community .... That stan-
dard contemplates that a state will justify its laws with reasons.
Concomitantly, the court will have the job of asking the state to
justify its laws with reasons when they are challenged. The question
of what is required to justify a law and how a court should apply the
balance of ordered liberty in any given case is of course a hard one
and not something I can resolve here. But we are not without guid-
ance in approaching such a task. Because the obligation to supply
reasons has been derived from the political equality of citizens and
the need for a government to respect the independent moral status
of each of its citizens, then a sense of the kinds of reasons one would
look for begins to take shape. For one thing, it cannot be a reason
that would degrade or devalue the basic conditions of equality for all.
So, for example, the standard "because we don't like you" argument,
81 Frank I. Michelman, Unenumerated Rights Under Popular Constitutionalism, 9 U. PA.J. CONST.
L. 121, 151 (2006).
82 Id. at 152.
83 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
84 W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
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found wanting in equal protection jurisprudence, 5 would also not be
sufficient here. Similarly, a claim that "the behavior you desire to do
is immoral" would have to be considered carefully to ensure it is not
just a rephrasing of the prior, inadequate justification. Deliberative
democracy theory employs a sophisticated inquiry whose purpose is
to determine whether a particular kind of reason is supported by a
principle of reciprocity, and thereby consistent with equality princi-
ples: reciprocity requires the offer of "reasons that can be justified to
all parties who are motivated to find fair terms of social coopera-• ,,816
tion. While it is impossible to establish a mechanical definition to
identify reasons that would satisfy such a standard, it is easy to think
of some that would not. A law founded on contested religious beliefs,
for example, would deny the fundamental equal status of citizens by
asking them to accept reasons that are not accessible to them without
adopting a particular religious creed.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas"7 reflects some-
thing of this attitude. The Court found that the reasons offered by
the state to justify its law criminalizing sodomy did not accord ade-
quate respect to the equal status of those asked to live under that
law.88 The Court offered this analysis as an interpretation of the lib-
erty component of the Due Process Clause, but, as all readers have
noticed, it resounds deeply in equality.
VII. THE LOGIC OF MAJORITY RULE
Equality was the starting place for my argument. Those who de-
fend majority rule as a first, last, or only resort in a democracy all rely
on arguments based on a commitment to equality. It seems fair to
say, therefore, that equality is the common ground from which to
proceed to consider the appropriate role of majority rule in our con-
stitutional democracy.
The next question was what a commitment to equality would re-
quire from the process of representation in a democracy. The Su-
preme Court has suggested that the principle of equality requires an
opportunity for individuals or groups to have influence on elected of-
85 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (invalidating an amendment to the Colo-
rado Constitution that would prohibit any state action to prevent discrimination against homo-
sexuals); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (striking down a
zoning ordinance prohibiting group homes for mentally retarded persons from certain dis-
tricts); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (holding unconstitutional an
amendment to the Food Stamp Act which "was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and
'hippie communes' from participating in the food stamp program").
8 GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 75, at 65.
87 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
98 See id. at 575-76.
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ficials; John Hart Ely has suggested that it requires a legislature to
take the interests of constituents into account at a value greater than
zero.
Turning to what it might mean to enjoy this right to influence or
to be taken into account, I have argued that, at a minimum, it in-
volves the right to demand reasons for a law that places burdens on
an individual or group. Reasons are the legislature's way of showing
that it has met its obligation to represent in the constitutional sense.
The offering of reasons is the heart of the judicial protection of
liberty under the Due Process Clause. Therefore, courts can give
meaning to the structural constitutional obligation on legislatures to
meet minimal obligations of representation by recognizing liberty
claims. Once such a claim is leveled, then the state brings forward its
reasons and the Court considers whether these reasons are sufficient
to accord with the equality guarantees of the Constitution. Thus, the
Court brings to fruition the commitment to equality that led our pol-
ity to majority rule in the first place.
When the Court seeks to protect underlying constitutional values
indirectly, as I have suggested it did with the representation-
reinforcing approaches to judicial review of the Warren Court and
the Rehnquist Court, and also with the accommodation of adminis-
trative agencies through invigorated enforcement of procedural due
process guarantees, it does not just randomly choose constitutional
standards to enforce. Rather, it identifies the kinds of harms that
might be expected to emerge as a result of the structural compro-
mises or malfunctions it has perceived, and the kinds of additional
incentives needed to avert those harms. The protection of liberty as a
safety net for the process of representation does just that.
Concerns over the structural integrity of the representative proc-
ess center around whether the elected representatives are institution-
ally capable of doing the job of representation, in a setting in which
accountability is diminished and special interests strong. When a
Court insists that the outputs of a legislative process be supported by
reasons, it encourages the representatives to take seriously the obliga-
tion to represent in a way that minimally respects the basic equality of
citizens. The correlation between equality and reason-giving is sub-
stantive and logical.
While there may be nothing a court could or should do to em-
broil itself in the political thicket of legislative deliberation, the cur-
rent state of representative politics provides grave reason to worry
about whether the representative process is doing either the job of
meaningfully effectuating self-government or the job of approximat-
ing government by consent. As these are two principal assumptions
providing the foundation for the legitimacy of the constitutional de-
mocracy, they are, to say the least, a big loss. It is not only legitimate,
therefore, but incumbent on the Court to seek to compensate for
[Vol. 9:1
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these structural concerns in ways that are consistent with constitu-
tional principle.
The logic of equality, traced through our commitment to majority
rule and carried forward, without artificial restraints on how far it
would be permitted to go, has brought us to the judicial protection,
in at least some minimal way, of unenumerated rights. By taking this
protection seriously, the Court should not be understood to throw
down a "trump" card to overpower majority rule or deprive majorities
of their right to govern as they see fit. Rather, it should be perceived
as providing the consistency of principle that makes majority rule
possible in a constitutional democracy committed to equality. By
protecting liberty in the name of equality, therefore, the Court en-
ables, rather than obstructs, democracy.
